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RECENT CASES

It is submitted that the true test should be simply the fact
of the contractor's negligence as a cause of the injury; certainly, a requirement of privity should not be the sine qua non
of a successful suit where it can be shown that the plaintiff's
harm has resulted directly from the defendant's negligent
construction. The instant case is representative of those cases
which still nominally adhere to the old rule but circumvent
that rule by superficially applying an exception theoretically
similar to the MacPherson doctrine.
MAURICE R. HUNKE
TAXATION-INTERNAL REVENUE-TRANSFERS MADE IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH-Within three years preceding his

death; decedent transferred residential property and cash to
four of his six children to enable each of them to purchase a
home. The court felt that the important and moving cause
behind the transfers to his children was the decedent's desire
to meet their present needs. The United States District Court,
held that the transfers to the children were not made in contemplation of death. In re Boyd, 192 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky.
1961).
Gifts apparently made as a substitute for testamentary dispositions are held to be made in contemplation of death.'
The legal definition of a transfer made in contemplation of
death is set out in The United States Code' as follows: "If the,
decedent within a period of three years ending with the date
of his death transferred an interest in property . . . such
transfer shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to,
have been made in contemplation of death . . ." When the;
transferror dies within three years from the time of such
transfer, the burden of proving that such transfer was not
made in contemplation of death is then upon the taxpayer."
The reasoning employed by the courts is that the thought of
death is the impelling cause of the transfer' and is not limited
to it being imminent.'
ty of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel
for the use of others."
19. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 28.10 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS§ 85 (2d. ed. 1955).
1.
2.
3.
4.
state,
5.

In re Wadsworth's Estate, 92 Mont. 135, 11 P.2d 788 (1932).
26 U.S.C. §2035(b) (I.R.C. 1954).
McGrew's v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1943).
Greer v. Glenn, 64 F. Supp. 1002, (E.D. Ky. 1946). In re Mann's Es219 Iowa 597, 258 N.W. 904 (1935).
In re Adam's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 309, 246 P.2d 625 (1952).
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The adjudication of a "contemplation of death" case must
be resolved from the facts peculiar to each case. In determining whether the donor's motives were in contemplation of
death, the courts have considered and weighed most heavily
the following four elements:
(1) The donor's state of mind,' e.g., the court held that a 77
year old, in a cheerful and optimistic mood, in good health and
had been leading an active life, had not made a gift, which was
one of a long series, in contemplation of death.' Conversely,
when the facts were that the donor knew he was seriously ill
at the time of the transfer it was held to have been made
within the purview of the statute.8
(2) The value of the gift.' Naturally, transfers of large
portions of the estate never escape the scrutiny of the courts
in their determination of gifts made in contemplation of
death. But even when the proportion of the gift to the size of
the estate is small, it may still be taxed, e.g., the deceased
made a gift to his wife of $23,000 out of a $2,000,000 estate
and it was held to be a material part of the estate and therefore taxable."
(3) The donor's age and condition of health, 1 e.g., the
court held that a 72 year old donor in poor health had made
gifts in contemplation of death." But, as may be seen in (1)
above, age does not play an important part unless it is coupled
with the elements of the condition of the donor's health or
state of mind.
(4) Whether the donor's motive in making the gift was intended as a distribution of the estate or as an act of generosity. If the former is intended, it is a substitute for testamentary disposition and therefore a gift in contemplation of
death."
If the motive is a desire for the donee to have present use,'
or to obtain some object desirable to him during his life it is
6. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
7. Estate of Cyrus M. Beachy, 15 T.C. 136 (1950).
8. Mossberg, v. McLaughlin, 125 Conn. 680, 7 A-2d 910 (1939).
9. Chase's Ex'x v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 471, 145 S.W.2d 58 (1940).
10. In re Stephenson's Estate, 171 Wis. 452, 177 N.W. 579 (1920).
11. Chase's Ex'x v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 471, 145 S.W.2d 58 (1940).
12. Ibid.
13. Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Parker, 117 Ohio St. 215, 158 N.E. 89
(1927).
14. In we Newman's Estate, 52 Cal. App. 2d 126, 125 P.2d 908 (1942). (The
deceased wanted his wife to continue in some business in which she could
use her artistic talents and knowledge of Interior decoration).
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not declared taxable.' Further, a transfer of property made
in order to be relieved of responsibilities," afford others experience in bearing them," or to have children independently
established" are transfers associated with life and are not
taxable. ,"
The contemplation of death statute in North Dakota' is
similar to the federal statute with the only exception a stipulation of two years prior to death rather than the federal
three year requirement.
DARRELL T. O'CONNELL
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-ACTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AS

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-The defendant was convicted of
grand larceny in the second degree. He and three accomplices
had stolen a number of guns, thereafter returning to the kitchen of the defendant's home. The defendant's wife unexpectedly entered the kitchen and saw the defendant and his
companions with the stolen guns. The trial court allowed her
to testify concerning this observation. On appeal the Court
of Appeals held, three justices dissenting, that although an
act may constitute a privileged communication under New
York statute,' such act must be induced by absolute confidence
in the marital relationship, and the communication must be
intended to be confidential. The dissent argued that all knowledge derived by reason of the marital relationship was privileged. People v. Melski, 176 N.E. 2d. 81 (N. Y. 1961).
Because the public interest demands that courts have access to all pertinent facts in deciding the truth of a litigated
issue, the policy of unrestricted inquiry is seldom curtailed.2
15. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931) (Decedent gave his children substantial sums of money during his lifetime so that he could advise them as to its proper use).
16. Estate of Anna Scott Farnum, 14 T.C. 884 (1950) (Decedent wanted
to protect her property from loss by speculation and consequently had a
trust indenture drawn up so the principal would be beyond her reach).
17. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 118 (1931).
18. Commissioner of Internal Rev. v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 95 F.2d 160,
163 (10th Cir. 1938) (Decedent desired to make the transfer so that his
daughter and her children would be provided for whatever might happen
to his own financial affairs).
19. Mossberg v. McLaughlin, 125 Conn. 680, 7 A.2d 910 (1939).
20. N.D. Cent. Code §57-37-04 (1961).
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 2445, Husband or wilfe as witness.-The husband
or wife of a person indicted or accused of a crime is in all cases a competent witness, on the examination or trial of such person; but neither
husband nor wife can be compelled to disclose a confidential communication, made by one to the other during their marriage."
2. See McMann v. Securities Exchange Comm., 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.
1937); Mooney v. New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 145 (1936).

